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ABSTRACT
In this paper we consider the problem of anonymizing datasets
in which each individual is associated with a set of items
that constitute private information about the individual. Il-
lustrative datasets include market-basket datasets and search
engine query logs. We formalize the notion of k-anonymity
for set-valued data as a variant of the k-anonymity model for
traditional relational datasets. We define an optimization
problem that arises from this definition of anonymity and
provide O(k log k) and O(1)-approximation algorithms for
the same. We demonstrate applicability of our algorithms
to the America Online query log dataset.
1. INTRODUCTION
Consider a dataset containing detailed information about
the private actions of individuals, e.g., a market-basket data-
set or a dataset of search engine query logs. Market-basket
datasets contain information about items bought by individ-
uals and search engine query logs contain detailed informa-
tion about the queries posed by users and the results that
were clicked on. There is often a need to publish such data
for research purposes. Market-basket data, for instance,
could be used for association rule mining and for the design
and testing of recommendation systems. Query logs could
be used to study patterns of query refinement, develop algo-
rithms for query suggestion and improve the overall quality
of search.
The publication of such data, however, poses a challenge
as far as the privacy of individual users is concerned. Even
after removing all personal characteristics of individuals such
as actual usernames and ip addresses, the publication of such
data is still subject to privacy attacks from attackers with
partial knowledge of the private actions of individuals. Our
work in this paper is motivated by two such recent data
releases and privacy attacks on them.
In August of 2006, America Online (AOL) released a large
portion of its search engine query logs for research pur-
poses. The dataset contained 20 million queries posed by
650, 000 AOL users over a 3 month period. Before releas-
ing the data, AOL ran a simplistic anonymization procedure
wherein every username was replaced by a random identi-
fier. Despite this basic protective measure, the New York
Times [6] demonstrated how the queries themselves could
essentially reveal the identities of users. For example, user
4417749 revealed herself to be a resident of Gwinnett County
in Lilburn, GA, by querying for businesses and services in
the area. She further revealed her last name by querying
for relatives. There were only 14 citizens with her last name
in Gwinnett County, and the user was quickly revealed to
be Thelma Arnold, a 62 year old woman living in Georgia.
From this point on, researchers at the New York Times could
look at all of the queries posed by Ms. Arnold over the 3
month period. The publication of the query log data thus
constituted a very serious privacy breach.
In October of 2006, Netflix announced the $1-million Net-
flix Prize for improving their movie recommendation system.
As a part of the contest Netflix publicly released a dataset
containing 100 million movie ratings created by 500, 000
Netflix subscribers over a period of 6 years. Once again, a
simplistic anonymization procedure of replacing usernames
with random identifiers was used prior to the release. Nev-
ertheless, it was shown that 84% of the subscribers could
be uniquely identified by an attacker who knew 6 out of
8 movies that the subscriber had rated outside of the top
500 [19].
The commonality between the AOL and Netflix datasets
is that each individual’s data is essentially a set of items.
Further this set of items is both identifying of the individ-
ual as well as private information about the individual, and
partial knowledge of this set of items is used in the privacy
attack. In the case of the Netflix data (representative of
market-basket data), for instance, it is the set of movies
that a subscriber rated, and in the case of the AOL data, it
is the set of queries that a user posed, also called the user
session.
Motivated by these examples, as well as by the very real
need for releasing such datasets for research purposes, we
propose a notion of anonymity for set-valued data in this
paper. Informally, a dataset is said to be k-anonymous if
every individual’s “set of items” is identical to those of at
least k−1 other individuals. So a user in the Netflix dataset
would be k-anonymous if at least k − 1 other users rated
exactly the same set of movies; a user in the AOL query
logs would be k-anonymous if at least k − 1 other users
posed exactly the same set of queries.
One simple way to achieve k-anonymity for a dataset
would be to simply remove every item from every user’s
set, or to add every item from the universe of items to ev-
ery single set. Naturally this would radically distort the
dataset rendering it useless for analyses. So instead, to pro-
vide greater utility than such a simplistic scheme, we seek to
make the minimal number of changes possible to the dataset
in order to achieve the anonymity requirements. We pro-
vide O(k log k) and O(1)-approximation algorithms for this
optimization problem. Further we demonstrate how these
algorithms can be scaled for application to massive modern
day datasets such as the AOL query logs. To summarize our
contributions.
• We define the notion of k-anonymity for set-valued
data and introduce an optimization problem for mini-
mally achieving k-anonymity in Section 3.
• We provide algorithms with approximation factors of
O(k log k) and O(1) for the optimization problem in
Section 4.
• In Section 5, we demonstrate how our algorithms can
be scaled for application to massive datasets and ex-
periment on the AOL logs .
Before proceeding further, note that illustrative datasets
used as motivating examples above also contain further user
information: time stamp information for when a rating was
given and the actual rating itself in the Netflix data; time
stamp information for when a query was posed and the query
result that was clicked on in the AOL data. However for the
purposes of this paper, we ignore these other attributes of
the dataset and discuss how they could potentially be dealt
with in Section 5.5. Indeed the privacy attacks mentioned
above did not involve knowledge of these other attributes,
and therefore the anonymization problem on even just the
reduced set of attributes is important to study.
We will next briefly review related work where we distin-
guish our problem from the traditional k-anonymity problem
that has been studied for relational datasets.
2. RELATED WORK
There has been considerable prior work on anonymizing
traditional relational datasets such as medical records. The
most widely studied anonymity definitions for such datasets
are k-anonymity [3, 18, 20, 23, 15] and its variants, l-diversity
[17] and t-closeness [16]. In all these definitions, certain
public attributes of the dataset are initially determined to
be “quasi-identifiers”. For instance, in a dataset of med-
ical records, attributes such as Date-of-Birth, Gender and
Zipcode would qualify as quasi-identifiers since in combina-
tion they can be used to uniquely identify 87% of the U.S.
population [23]. A dataset is then said to be k-anonymous if
every record in the dataset is identical to at least k−1 other
records on its quasi-identifying attribute values. The idea
is that privacy is achieved if every individual is hidden in a
crowd of size at least k. Anonymization algorithms achieve
the k-anonymity requirement by suppressing and generaliz-
ing the quasi-identifying attribute values of records. A triv-
ial way to achieve k-anonymity would be to simply suppress
every single attribute value in the dataset, but this would
completely destroy the utility of the dataset. Instead, in
order to preserve utility, the algorithms attempt to achieve
the anonymity requirement with a minimum number of sup-
pressions and generalizations.
The kinds of datasets that we consider in this paper differ
from traditional relational datasets in two ways. First, each
database record in our scenario essentially corresponds to a
set of items. The database records could thus be of variable
length and high dimensionality. Further, there is no longer a
clear distinction between private attributes and quasi iden-
tifiers. A user’s queries are both private information about
the user as well as identifying of the user himself. Similarly,
in the case of market-basket data, the set of items bought by
an individual are private information about the individual
and at the same time can be used to identify the individual.
Our definition of anonymity and anonymization algorithms
are applicable for such set-valued data.
In [24] the authors study the problem of anonymizing
market-basket data. They propose a notion of anonymity
similar to k-anonymity where a limit is placed on the num-
ber of private items of any individual that could be known to
an attacker beforehand. The authors provide generalization
algorithms to achieve the anonymity requirements. For ex-
ample, an item ‘milk’ in a user’s basket may be generalized
to ‘dairy product’ in order to protect it. In contrast, the
techniques we propose consider additions and deletions to
the dataset instead of generalizations. Further, we demon-
strate applicability of our algorithms to search engine query
log data as well where there is no obvious underlying hier-
archy that can be used to generalize queries.
Our O(1)-approximation algorithm is derived by reducing
the anonymization problem to a clustering problem. Clus-
tering techniques for achieving anonymity have also been
studied in [2], however here the authors seek to minimize
the maximum radius of the clustering, whereas we wish to
minimize the sum of the Hamming distances of points to
their cluster centers.
In [25] the authors propose the notion of (h, k, p)-coherence
for anonymizing transactional data. Here once again there
is a division of items into public and private items. The
goal of the anonymization is to ensure that for any set of
p public items, either no transaction contains this set, or
at least k transactions contain it, and no more than h per-
cent of these transactions contain a common private item.
The authors consider the minimal number of suppressions
required to achieve these anonymity goals, however no the-
oretical guarantees are given.
Besides the k-anonymization based techniques, there has
also been considerable work on anonymizing datasets by the
addition of noise or perturbation [4, 9, 5]. We do not con-
sider perturbation-based approaches in this paper.
With regards to search engine query logs, there has been
work on identifying privacy attacks both on users [14] as well
as on companies whose websites appear in query results and
get clicked on [21]. We do not consider the latter kind of
privacy attack in this paper. [14] considers an anonymiza-
tion procedure wherein keywords in queries are replaced by
secure hashes. The authors show that such a procedure is
susceptible to statistical attacks on the hashed keywords,
leading to privacy breaches. There has also been work on
defending against privacy attacks on users in [1]. This line of
work considers heuristics such as the removal of infrequent
queries and develops methods to apply such techniques on
the fly as new queries are posed. In contrast, we consider a
static scenario wherein a search engine would like to publicly
release an existing set of query logs.
3. DEFINITIONS
Let D = {S1, . . . , Sn} be a dataset containing n records.
Each record Si is a set of items. Formally Si is a non-empty
subset of a universe of items, U = {e1, e2, . . . , em}. We can
then define an anonymous dataset as follows.
Definition 1. (k-Anonymity for Set-Valued Data) We say
ID Contents
S1 {e1, e2, e3}
S2 {e1, e2}
S3 {e1, e3}
S4 {e4, e5, e6}
S5 {e4, e5}
(a) Original
Dataset
ID Contents
S1 {e1, e2, e3}
S2 {e1, e2, e3}
S3 {e1, e2, e3}
S4 {e4, e5}
S5 {e4, e5}
(b) 2-Anonymous
Transformation
Figure 1: 2-Anonymization
that D is k-anonymous if every record Si ∈ D is identical to
at least k − 1 other records.
Given this definition, we can now define an optimization
problem that asks for the minimum number of transforma-
tions to be made to a dataset to obtain an anonymized
dataset.
Definition 2. (The k-Anonymization Problem for Set-Val-
ued Data) Given a dataset D = {S1, . . . , Sn}, find the min-
imum number of items that need to be added to or deleted
from the sets S1, . . . , Sn to ensure that the resulting dataset
D′ is k-anonymous.
We illustrate the k-anonymization problem with an exam-
ple.
Example 1. Consider the dataset in Figure 1(a). The
dataset in Figure 1(b) represents a 2-anonymous transfor-
mation that is obtained by making 2 additions and 1 dele-
tion. The items e3 and e2 are added to records S2 and
S3 respectively while the item e6 is deleted from record S4.
The resulting dataset consists of two 2-anonymous groups:
{S1, S2, S3} and {S4, S5}.
As a more concrete example, in the case of market-basket
data, the dataset consists of records, where each record
is a basket of items purchased by an individual. The k-
anonymization problem then is to add or delete items to
individuals’ baskets so that every basket is identical to at
least k − 1 other baskets.
In the case of search engine query logs, the records corre-
spond to user sessions. Instead of treating each user session
as a set of queries, we considered a relaxed problem and
treat each user session as a set of query terms or keywords.
See Section 5 for the details. The k-anonymization problem
then becomes one of adding or deleting keywords to or from
user sessions to ensure that each user session becomes iden-
tical to at least k − 1 other user sessions. Since no two user
sessions are likely to be similar on all the queries, we con-
sider a slightly modified problem in our experiments. Each
user session is first separated into “topic-based” threads, and
our goal becomes one of anonymizing these threads instead
of the original sessions. The result is an increase in the util-
ity of the released dataset. Again, Section 5 elaborates on
the details.
More generally, the dataset can be thought of as a bipar-
tite graph, with sets (user sessions/baskets/individuals) rep-
resented as nodes on the left hand side and items of the uni-
verse (keywords searched for/items purchased/movies rated)
as nodes on the right hand side. The k-anonymization prob-
lem then is to add or delete edges in the bipartite graph so
ID e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6
S1 1 1 1 0 0 0
S2 1 1 0 0 0 0
S3 1 0 1 0 0 0
S4 0 0 0 1 1 1
S5 0 0 0 1 1 0
Figure 2: Dataset from Figure 1(a) as a relational
dataset
that every node on the left hand side is identical to at least
k − 1 other nodes.
Depending on the application, it may make sense to re-
strict the set of permissible operations to only additions or
only deletions, however in this paper we consider the most
general version of the problem that permits both.
4. APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS
Given these definitions, we are now ready to devise algo-
rithms for optimally achieving k-anonymity. We first draw
connections between the k-anonymization problem for set-
valued data and other optimization problems that have pre-
viously been studied in literature, namely, the suppression-
based k-anonymization problem for relational data and the
load-balanced facility location problem. The reductions to
these problems automatically give us the approximation al-
gorithms we desire. In what follows we do not describe the
algorithms themselves, rather only the reductions. The al-
gorithms can be found in [18, 3, 20, 10, 13, 22].
A natural question that arises is whether traditional k-
anonymity algorithms that involve suppressions and gener-
alizations can be used for the k-anonymization problem for
set-valued data as defined in Section 1. To this end, we first
translate the set-valued dataset to a traditional relational
dataset.
Transforming D to RD
A dataset D = {S1, . . . , Sn} can be transformed to a tradi-
tional relational dataset RD by creating a binary attribute
for every item ei in the universe and a tuple for every set
Si. Each tuple will then be a vector in {0, 1}
m. The 1’s
correspond to items in the universe that a set contains and
the 0’s correspond to those that it does not1. For exam-
ple, the dataset from Figure 1(a) translates to the dataset
in Figure 2.
The k-anonymization problem over D now translates to
the following problem over RD:
Definition 3. (k-Anonymization via Flips) Given a dataset
RD over a binary alphabet {0, 1}, flip as few 0’s to 1’s and
1’s to 0’s in RD as possible so that every tuple is identical
to at least k − 1 other tuples.
It is trivial to see that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between feasible solutions for the k-anonymization problem
1Note that at no point do our approximation algorithms ever
explicitly construct these bit vectors. Rather they operate
directly on the set representations of the tuples, comput-
ing intersections of pairs of sets. The algorithms therefore
scale with the maximum set size rather than m. The bit
vector representations have only been used here for ease of
exposition.
over D and the flip-based k-anonymization problem over
RD.
Proposition 1. Any feasible solution, Sflip, to the flip-
based k-anonymization problem over RD can be converted to
a feasible solution, S±, of the same cost for the k-anonymiza-
tion problem over D and vice versa.
Proof Sketch. For every 0 that is flipped to a 1 in Sflip,
simply add the corresponding item to the corresponding set
in S±, and for every 1 that is flipped to a 0, delete the item
from the set.
Now the flip-based k-anonymization problem can be solved
using suppression-based k-anonymization techniques for tra-
ditional relational datasets studied in [18, 3, 20]. The prob-
lem studied here essentially boils down to the following.
Definition 4. (k-Anonymization via Suppressions) Given
a dataset RD over a binary alphabet {0, 1}, what are the
minimum number of 0′s and 1′s in RD that need to be
converted to *’s to ensure that every tuple is identical to
at least k − 1 other tuples.
Now it is easy to see that the following holds.
Proposition 2. Any feasible solution S∗ to the suppression-
based k-anonymization problem can be converted to a feasible
flip-based solution Sflip using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Converting S∗ to Sflip
1: //input: RD, S∗
2: for every k-anonymous group of tuples G in S∗ do
3: for every column C do
4: //CG = C values for rows in G in RD
5: if number of 1’s in CG > number of 0’s then
6: flip the 0’s in CG to 1’s
7: else
8: flip the 1’s in CG to 0’s
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
The algorithm essentially takes every k-anonymous group
of tuples in S∗. Then for any column in the group that is
suppressed (*ed out), it replaces the column for that group
entirely with 1’s or entirely with 0’s depending on which
action would involve a fewer number of flips in the original
dataset RD.
Example 2. Figure 3 shows an example of an original dataset,
a 2-anonymous dataset S∗ obtained via suppressions, and
a flip-based 2-anonymous dataset Sflip obtained by apply-
ing Algorithm 1 to S∗. In both the solutions, the two 2-
anonymous groups are {S1, S4, S5} and {S2, S3, S6}.
Now we can show the following about Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1. For a given dataset RD, let the cost of a fea-
sible solution S∗ to the suppression-based k-anonymization
problem be within a factor α of the cost of the optimal solu-
tion. Then the cost of Sflip obtained by applying Algorithm 1
to S∗ is within a factor of O(kα) of the cost of the optimal
solution for the flip-based k-anonymization problem.
ID e1 e2 e3
S1 1 1 0
S2 0 0 1
S3 1 0 1
S4 1 0 0
S5 1 0 0
S6 1 0 1
(a) Original dataset
ID e1 e2 e3
S1 1 * 0
S2 * 0 1
S3 * 0 1
S4 1 * 0
S5 1 * 0
S6 * 0 1
(b) S∗
ID e1 e2 e3
S1 1 0 0
S2 1 0 1
S3 1 0 1
S4 1 0 0
S5 1 0 0
S6 1 0 1
(c) Sflip
Figure 3: Sflip is obtained from S∗ via Algorithm 1
Proof. Let OPT∗ and OPTflip be the optimal solutions
to the suppression-based and flip-based k-anonymization prob-
lems over RD respectively. Then it is easy to see that
Cost(OPT∗) ≤ (2k − 1)Cost(OPTflip). This is because ev-
ery k-anonymous group of tuples in OPTflip consists of at
most 2k − 1 tuples. Further, this group can be converted
to a k-anonymous group obtained by suppressions by *ing
out any column that contains a flip (essentially the reverse
of Algorithm 1).
It is also easy to see that the cost of any solution Sflip ob-
tained by applying Algorithm 1 to a solution S∗ is less than
the cost of S∗. This gives us the following set of inequalities
and our desired result.
Cost(Sflip) ≤ Cost(S∗)
≤ αCost(OPT∗)
≤ α(2k − 1)Cost(OPTflip)
The best possible suppression-based k-anonymization al-
gorithm thus gives us a good flip-based anonymization al-
gorithm through the application of Algorithm 1. Since the
suppression-based algorithm from [20] has an approximation
ratio of O(log k), Theorem 1 together with Proposition 1
gives us the following result.
Corollary 1. There exists an O(k log k)-approximation
algorithm to the k-anonymization problem for set-valued data.
The suppression algorithm from [20] essentially consid-
ers all possible partitions of the dataset into k-anonymous
groups and chooses a good one using a set-cover type greedy
algorithm.
The translation of D to RD also enables the insight that
the k-anonymization problem over set-valued data is essen-
tially a clustering problem. Each set can be viewed as vec-
tor in {0, 1}m. The optimal solution to the following clus-
tering problem then gives us an optimal solution to the k-
anonymization problem for set-valued data.
Definition 5. (The k-Group Clustering Problem) Given a
set of points in {0, 1}m, cluster the points into groups of size
at least k and assign cluster centers in {0, 1}m so that the
sum of the Hamming distances of the points to their cluster
centers is minimized.
The following proposition tells us that there is a one-to-
one correspondence between feasible solutions to the k-group
clustering problem and the k-anonymization problem for set-
valued data.
Proposition 3. Given a solution, Sgroup, to the k-group
clustering problem over a dataset RD, we can obtain a so-
lution S± of the same cost to the k-anonymization problem
over D and vice versa.
Proof Sketch. For every cluster in Sgroup, create a k-anonym-
ous group of the sets corresponding to the cluster points in
S±. k-anonymity is achieved by adding or deleting items as
necessary so that every set in the group becomes identical
to the set corresponding to the cluster center. The sum of
the Hamming distances of points to their cluster centers in
Sgroup thus corresponds to the total number of additions
and deletions of items to obtain the solution S±.
Given Proposition 3, we can now focus on solving the k-
group clustering problem from here on. In this regard, the
following result tells us that it suffices to consider potential
cluster centers from amongst the data points themselves.
Theorem 2. The cost of the optimal solution to the k-
group clustering problem when the cluster centers are chosen
from amongst the set of data points themselves is at most
twice the cost of the optimal solution to the k-group clus-
tering problem when the cluster centers are allowed to be
arbitrary points in {0, 1}m.
Proof. Let OPT be the optimal solution to the k-group
clustering problem when the cluster centers are allowed to be
arbitrary points in {0, 1}m. Now consider a solution Srand
that maintains the same cluster groups as OPT , but replaces
each cluster center with a randomly chosen data point from
within the cluster. The expected cost of this solution is
given below.
E[Cost(Srand)] =
X
G∈G
X
C∈C
2NCG
1
N
CG
0
N
CG
1
+NCG
0
Here G is the set of all clusters in Srand (which is the same
as the set of clusters in OPT ). C is the columns/dimensions
of the dataset RD. N
CG
1
and NCG
0
are the number of 1’s
and number of 0’s respectively that the points in a cluster
G have in column C. The cost of the optimal solution on
the other hand is given by
Cost(OPT ) =
X
G∈G
X
C∈C
min(NCG
1
, N
CG
0
).
By simple algebraic manipulation, it is easy to see that
E[Cost(Srand)] ≤ 2Cost(OPT ).
Since the expected cost of Srand is less than twice the cost
of OPT , there must exist some clustering solution where
the cluster centers are chosen from the data points them-
selves whose cost is less than twice the cost of OPT . This
completes the proof of the theorem.
Theorem 2 considerably simplifies the clustering problem
since there is now only a linear number of potential cluster
centers that need be considered (as opposed to 2m). We can
now frame this modified k-group clustering problem as an
integer program.
min
P
i,j
xijdij
s.t xij ≤ yj ∀ i, jP
i xij ≥ kyj ∀ j
xij , yj ∈ {0, 1} ∀ i, j
Here yj is an indicator variable that indicates whether or
not data point Sj is chosen as a cluster center. xij is an in-
dicator variable that indicates whether or not data point Si
is assigned to cluster center Sj and dij is the Hamming dis-
tance between data points Si and Sj . This integer program-
ming formulation is exactly equivalent to the load-balanced
facility location problem studied in [10, 13, 22]. The cluster
centers can be thought of as facilities, and the data points
as demand points. The task then is to open facilities and
assign demand points to opened facilities so that the sum of
the distances to the facilities is minimized and every facility
has at least k demand points assigned to it. The algorithms
for this problem work by solving a modified instance of a
regular facility location problem (without the load balanc-
ing constraints), and then grouping together facilities that
have fewer than k demand points assigned to them. The
result from [22] in conjunction with Theorem 2 and Propo-
sition 3, gives us the following result.
Theorem 3. There exists an O(1)-approximation algo-
rithm for the k-anonymization problem for set-valued data.
To reemphasize the earlier footnote, the approximation al-
gorithms for suppression-based anonymization or load-bala-
nced facility location never need to explicitly compute and
operate on the bit vector representations of the records.
They can operate directly on the set representations, com-
puting distances between pairs of sets. Algorithm 1 need
not operate on the bit-vector representations either. It can
simply take every k-group of sets and add every majority
item in the group to all the sets in the group, while deleting
other items.
5. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we experimentally demonstrate applicabil-
ity of our anonymization algorithms to the AOL query log
dataset. Recall (Definition 1) that in this dataset records
correspond to user sessions and items correspond to the
query terms/keywords. As mentioned earlier, the query log
dataset also contains other attributes that we ignore in this
paper (see Section 5.5 for a discussion). Our goal then is
to add or delete keywords from user sessions so that every
session becomes identical to at least k − 1 others.
The anonymization algorithms from Section 4 cannot be
directly applied to the AOL dataset for several reasons: (1)
No two users in the dataset are likely to be similar on all
their queries since each user session is fairly large, repre-
senting 3 months of queries. The algorithms when directly
applied to the user sessions would thus result in a large num-
ber of additions and deletions. (2) The dataset consists of
millions of users. The algorithms from Section 4 have a
quadratic running time and therefore cannot be practically
applied to such real world datasets directly. And (3) Differ-
ent keywords from different users could often be misspellings
of each other or derivations from a common stem. The con-
ditions for considering two user sessions to be “identical”
thus need to be relaxed.
We describe below the steps we took to overcome these
three problems.
5.1 Separating User Sessions into Threads
To deal with the issue of large user sessions, we consid-
ered a relaxed problem definition: Each user session was
first divided into smaller threads and a different random
identifier was assigned to each thread. We then considered
the anonymization problem over these threads instead of the
original sessions. Each user thread was treated as a set of
keywords and our goal was to add or delete keywords from
user threads so that every user thread became identical to
threads from at least k − 1 other users.
One trivial way to divide sessions into threads is to treat
every single query from a user as a thread of its own and as-
sign a random identifier to it. However this would render the
data nearly useless for many forms of analysis (e.g., study-
ing patterns of query refinement). Instead “topic-based”
threads were determined on the basis of the similarity of
constituent queries. For this purpose we employed two sim-
ple measures to determine query similiarity:
• Edit distance: Two queries were deemed similar if the
edit distance between them was less than a threshold.
• Overlapping result sets: Two queries were deemed sim-
ilar if the result sets returned for each query by a search
engine had a large overlap in the top 50 results.
Using these similarity measures, each user session was sep-
arated into multiple threads: Queries in a user session were
considered in the order of their time stamps. A query that
was similar to one seen before was assigned the same iden-
tifier as the previous query. A query that was very differ-
ent from any of the previously seen queries was assigned a
new identifier. This was followed by another round where
consecutive threads that contained similar queries were col-
lapsed and so on. This algorithm for determining threads
was run on a random sample of ∼ 82K users who posed a to-
tal of ∼ 412K queries. The 82K user sessions were split into
∼ 165K threads. Each thread had on average 2.55 unique
keywords.
There may of course exist more sophisticated techniques
for separating sessions into topic-based threads, however this
is not the focus in this paper. Note that the shift in goal from
anonymizing sessions to anonymizing threads, enhances the
utility of the released dataset (anonymizing entire sessions
would require far too many additions and deletions), with-
out affecting privacy too much. In fact, as we shall see
in Section 5.4, the separation into threads itself helps in
anonymization.
5.2 Pre-clustering User Threads
As mentioned earlier, the algorithms from Section 4 have a
quadratic running time, and cannot be practically applied to
our dataset of user threads. To make them more scaleable,
we first performed a preliminary clustering step where we
clustered similar user threads together using a simple, fast
clustering algorithm, and then applied the k-anonymization
algorithms from Section 4 to the threads within each cluster.
If a cluster had fewer than k user threads, we simply deleted
these threads altogether. Running the k-anonymization al-
gorithms within these small clusters was much more efficient
than running them directly on all the user threads at once.
To do the preliminary clustering, we used the Jaccard co-
efficient as a similarity measure for user threads. Recall
that each thread Si is a subset of the universe of keywords
U = {e1, . . . , em}. Under the Jaccard measure, the similar-
ity of two user threads, Si and Sj is given by
Sim(Si, Sj) =
|Si ∩ Sj |
|Si ∪ Sj |
A straightforward clustering algorithm would involve a
comparison between every pair of user threads and would
thus be very ineffcient. Instead, to quickly cluster all the
user threads, we used Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH). The
LSH technique was introduced in [12] to efficiently solve the
nearest-neighbour search problem. The key idea is to hash
each user thread using several different hash functions, en-
suring that for each function, the probability of collision is
much higher for threads that are similar to each other than
for those that are different. The Jaccard coefficient as a simi-
larity measure admits an LSH scheme called Min-Hashing [8,
7].
The basic idea in the Min-Hashing scheme is to randomly
permute the universe of keywords U , and for each user thread
Si, compute its hash value MH(Si) as the index of the first
item under the permutation that belongs to Si. It can be
shown [8, 7] that for a random permutation the probability
that two user threads have the same hash function is exactly
equal to their Jaccard coefficient. Thus Min-Hashing is a
probabilistic clustering algorithm, where each hash bucket
corresponds to a cluster that puts together two user threads
with probability proportional to their Jaccard coefficient.
The LSH algorithm [12] concatenates p hash-keys for users
so that the probability that any two users Si and Sj agree on
their concatenated hash-keys is equal to Sim(Si, Sj)
p. The
concatenation of hash-keys thus creates refined clusters with
high precision. Typical values for p that we tried were in the
range 2− 4.
Clearly generating random permutations over the universe
of keywords and storing them to compute Min-Hash values is
not feasible. So instead, we generated a set of p independent,
random seed values, one for each Min-Hash function and
mapped each user thread to a hash-value computed using the
seed. This hash-value serves as a proxy for the index in the
random permutation. The approximate Min-Hash values
thus computed have properties similar to the ideal Min-Hash
value [11]. See [11] for more details on this technique.
As a result of running the LSH-based clustering algorithm
on our user threads, we otained a total of ∼ 84K clusters.
Each cluster contained an average of 2 user threads. The
largest cluster contained ∼ 2800 threads and corresponded
to the queries that searched for ‘Google’ !
Again, there may exist more sophisticated techniques for
clustering similar user threads together, however this is not
the focus of this paper, which is meant to be more of a proof
of concept.
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Figure 4: Cost of achieving k-anonymity
5.3 k-Anonymity within Clusters
Now within each cluster generated using the LSH scheme
above, we ran the k-anonymization algorithm from Section 4
(i.e., the suppression algorithm from [20] followed by the
application of Algorithm 1).
Before proceeding further, we need to clarify the criterion
that was used for deeming two user threads to be identical.
As mentioned earlier, different user threads might contain
keywords that are actually just misspellings of each other or
derivations from a common stem. To deal with this issue,
we once again resorted to LSH. We treated each user thread
as a set of Locality Sensitive Hashes [8, 7] of its constituent
keywords, i.e., a user thread Si = {e1, . . . , eℓ} now became
Si = {LSH(e1), . . . ,LSH(eℓ)} where LSH(ej) is a concate-
nation of Min-Hashes of the keyword ej
2. Two user threads
were considered identical if they had the same set of hashes.
Now if a k-anonymous solution for a particular cluster
deemed that a certain LSH value must be deleted from a
particular user thread, we simply deleted all the keywords
from the user thread that generated that LSH value. If the
solution asked for a LSH value to be added to a user thread,
we added to the thread one of the keywords from its cluster
that generated the LSH value. Threads in clusters of size
less than k were entirely deleted.
Figure 4 shows the total number of additions and dele-
tions of keywords that were made for different values of k.
As would be expected, as k increases, the total number of
additions and deletions that need to be made to achieve k-
anonymity increases. The number of additions is a small
fraction of the total cost, and surprisingly goes down as k
increases.
5.4 Case Study
As anecdotal evidence of the effectiveness of our algo-
rithms in anonymizing query logs, we looked at the query
logs of user 4417749 who had been previously been identified
as Ms. Thelma Arnold from Lilburn, Georgia.
Figure 5(a) shows a sample of user 4417749’s query logs.
Misspellings have been maintained, however repeated queries
have been removed. As can be seen, the user searched for
2Each keyword can be treated as a multiset of characters
4417749 pine straw lilburn delivery
4417749 pine straw delivery in gwinnett county
4417749 pine straw in lilburn ga.
4417749 atlant humane society
4417749 atlanta humane society
4417749 dekalb animal shelter
4417749 dekalb humane society
4417749 gwinnett animal shelter
4417749 doraville animal shelter
4417749 humane society
4417749 gwinnett humane society
4417749 seffects of nicotine
4417749 effects of nicotine
4417749 nicotine effects on the body
4417749 jarrett arnold
4417749 jarrett t. arnold
4417749 jarrett t. arnold eugene oregon
4417749 eugene oregon jaylene arnold
4417749 jaylene and jarrett arnold eugene or.
...
(a) User 4417749’s Session
1 4417749 pine straw lilburn delivery mulch
1 4417749 pine straw delivery in gwinnett county
1 4417749 pine straw in lilburn ga.
———————————————
2 4417749 atlant humane society county
2 4417749 atlanta humane society
2 4417749 dekalb animal shelter
2 4417749 dekalb humane society
2 4417749 gwinnett animal shelter
2 4417749 doraville animal shelter
2 4417749 humane society
2 4417749 gwinnett humane society
———————————————
3 4417749 seffects of nicotine
3 4417749 effects of nicotine
3 4417749 nicotine effects on the body
———————————————
4 4417749 jarrett arnold
4 4417749 jarrett t. arnold
4 4417749 jarrett t. arnold eugene oregon
4 4417749 eugene oregon jaylene arnold
4 4417749 jaylene and jarrett arnold eugene or.
...
(b) User 4417749’s anonymized threads
Figure 5: User 4417749’s Query Logs
some fairly generic queries such as the “effects of nicotine
on the body”. However she also posed several identifying
queries. For instance, she queried for humane societies and
animal shelters in Gwinnett county, Georgia, revealing her-
self to be an animal lover in Gwinnett county. Further, she
queried for pine straw delivery in Lilburn, Gwinnett, thereby
revealing herself to be a resident of Lilburn, Gwinnett. Fi-
nally, her queries for relatives in Oregon revealed that her
last name was “Arnold”.
Figure 5(b) shows the result of running our k-anonymizat-
ion algorithm for k = 3. Notice first that the division of
Ms. Arnold’s session into threads itself goes some way in
anonymization by de-correlating her various query topics.
The session sample was divided into a thread for pine straw
delivery, a thread for animal shelters and humane societies, a
thread for the effects of nicotine and a thread for the queries
about relatives in Oregon. Each thread was assigned a sep-
arate identifier.
The threads were treated as sets of unique keywords (not
depicted in the figure) and were then clustered with the
threads of other users using LSH. The anonymization algo-
rithms were run within the resulting clusters. If a partic-
ular keyword was to be deleted from a particular thread,
we deleted every occurence of that keyword from the origi-
nal queries of the thread. If a keyword was to be added to
a thread, we added it to one of the original queries of the
thread. The result was that some threads such as the nico-
tine thread were left relatively untouched. In the thread
for pine straw delivery, the keywords ‘lilburn’, ‘delivery’,
‘gwinnett’, ‘county’ and ‘ga.’ were deleted, and the keyword
‘mulch’ was added instead. This is because other users in
the thread’s cluster, querying for ‘pine straw’, queried for
it in conjunction with the keyword ‘mulch’. Similarly, in
the thread for animal shelters and humane societies, the
keywords ‘gwinnett’ and ‘doraville’ were removed, while the
keyword ‘county’ was added since many users searched for
animal shelters in ‘dekalb county’. Finally, the thread for
the relatives in Oregon was deleted altogether because not a
sufficient number of threads from other users got clustered
with it. Many users queried for ‘arnold schwarzenegger’,
however none of their threads fell in the same cluster!
This example shows that our algorithm does the intu-
itively right thing. Identifying keywords are removed and
keywords that commonly occur in conjunction with other
keywords are added to a user’s threads. The guarantee is
that every user thread will look like the threads of at least
k− 1 other users, and this guarantee is achieved while mak-
ing a close to minimal number of additions and deletions.
5.5 Discussion
While the example of Ms. Thelma Arnold seems to indi-
cate that our anonymization algorithms do the right thing
for query logs, our experimental work here is in reality a
first step due to the complex nature of the dataset. Several
points require further discussion.
Other Attributes: As mentioned earlier, query logs
contain other information about user activity, namely time
stamp information for when a query was posed and the
query result that was clicked on. Our algorithm focussed
on anonymizing just the queries themselves, whereas it is
conceivable that these other attributes of the dataset may
also be used in launching privacy attacks. One possible
anonymization approach is to treat these other attribute val-
ues as items of the universe as well and proceed as before.
So for example, if a majority of users queried for the Indiana
Jones movie on the day that it was released, then this day
would be added as part of the time stamp to all user threads
on the Indiana Jones movie. The drawback to this approach
could be a loss of very fine-grained time stamp information
and a better understanding of utility is required before this
approach can be recommended.
Privacy: In adapting our algorithm to the query logs, we
considered a relaxation of the original problem statement:
instead of anonymizing entire sessions, we anonymized threads.
The privacy implications of this relaxation need to be fur-
ther examined. At first glance, it seems that the division
of the user sessions into threads only helps in our privacy
goals by de-correlating a user’s query topics. However there
is no “proof” that a user’s threads could not somehow be
stitched together to reconstruct his session, which would
then no longer be k-anonymous. An experimental or the-
oretical study of the implications of our problem relaxation
would be an interesting avenue for future work.
Utility: Our approach of treating a thread as a set of
keywords affects the utility of the released dataset. For ex-
ample, in Figure 5(b), the keyword ‘county’ was added to
the query for ‘atlant humane society’ since it was to be in-
discriminately added to any one of the queries in the thread.
In reality it should have been added to the query for ‘dekalb
animal shelter’ and that too in the semantically correct po-
sition as ‘dekalb county animal shelter’. Thus by treating
threads as sets of keywords, we loose potentially important
information about the ordering of keywords within queries.
Another point regarding utility, is our criterion for measur-
ing the utility of the released dataset. As in traditional k-
anonymity work, the criterion we used was to minimize the
total number of changes made to the dataset. A better met-
ric for measuring the utility of the released dataset would be
to measure the impact of the anonymization on algorithms
that actually use the dataset. For example, how well does a
search engine’s query suggestion algorithm work when run
on the released dataset instead of the original. This is a
very interesting question, that would need to be ultimately
answered for evaluating the utility of any anonymization
scheme.
6. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we introduced the k-anonymization problem
for set-valued data. Algorithms with approximation factors
of O(k log k) and O(1) for the problem were developed. We
applied our anonymization algorithms to the AOL query log
dataset. In order to scale the algorithms to deal with the
size of the dataset, we proposed a division of the dataset
into clusters, followed by the application of anonymization
algorithms within the clusters. Besides the problems men-
tioned in Section 5.5, there are several other avenues for
future work. For instance, one interesting research direction
would be to develop scaleable anonymization algorithms for
massive modern day datasets with provable approximation
guarantees. Another important research question is how
such algorithms can be applied to anonymize datasets on
the fly as new records get added to them. For example, as a
search engine receives new queries, how should it anonymize
them in an online fashion before storing them.
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